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*L.Q.R. 295 I. INTRODUCTION
ENGLISH law provides a range of corporate insolvency procedures.1 These serve a variety of
functions, including collective execution by unsecured creditors, the facilitation of corporate rescue
and the enforcement of security, as well as certain public goals including the enforcement of
commercial morality.2 Going to the heart of each procedure are fundamental questions about which
parties are involved, which assets are included and how proceedings are to be funded. It is simple
enough to suppose that the answers to these questions should differ according to the function of the
particular procedure. Yet insolvency law has developed in the haphazard manner of a medieval
building, with new parts being added to existing ones without much concern for the coherence of the
resulting edifice or whether the foundations will take the weight. This process has resulted in
confusion, sometimes even of fundamental matters, among judges, legislators and commentators.
One of the greatest sources of confusion has been the question of funding.Without funds to pay
costs, insolvency practitioners are powerless to help creditors. It is therefore understandable that, at
times, judges have been tempted to strain statutory construction so as to enhance the funds available
to the office-holder. Thus, in Re Barleycorn Enterprises Ltd, 3 the Court of Appeal held that a
liquidator's expenses were payable out of floating charge assets. Unfortunately, Barleycorn seemed
to imply that a liquidator might recoup the costs of unsuccessful litigation out of floating charge
assets, even where the action was a challenge to the validity of the debenture itself. This lead to
further strained constructions as the judiciary sought to prevent the “loser pays” principle of civil
litigation from being undermined.
Against this background, this article argues that the House of Lords' recent decision in Buchler v
Talbot, 4 finding that liquidation expenses are not payable out of floating charge assets, is a welcome
return to clarity. *L.Q.R. 296 The decision reasserts the importance of answering fundamental
questions about the scope and funding of insolvency procedures by reference to their function. More
importantly still, by overruling Barleycorn --the decision at the root of many of the difficulties relating to
the funding of insolvency litigation--Buchler offers a means of rationalising the existing precedents in
a way that may increase the chances that statutory rights of action vested in liquidators for the benefit
of unsecured creditors will actually be used.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section II gives an overview of the decision in Buchler.
Their Lordships' conclusion flows from two premises, which are considered in more detail in Sections
III and IV respectively. These premises are first, that the assets available for distribution in liquidation
form a fund distinct from those assets subject to security; and secondly, that the function of liquidation
is a collective execution in favour of unsecured creditors. From these starting points, it follows
logically that the general expenses of liquidation should not be payable out of assets “belonging” to a
secured creditor who does not benefit from the liquidation, without very clear statutory words to the
contrary. Rather, the assets available for the debenture-holder should only have to bear the costs
associated with the administration, realisation and distribution of those assets. In Section V, the article
turns to the positive consequences of Buchler for the funding of insolvency litigation, arguing that it
has opened the way for the development of a market for the external financing of office-holder actions
in insolvency. Section VI briefly concludes.
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II. BUCHLER V TALBOT AND ITS ANTECEDENTS
The statutory framework
Section 115 of the Insolvency Act 1986 provides that the expenses of liquidation shall have priority
over the claims of creditors in liquidation:
“All expenses properly incurred in the winding up, including the remuneration of the liquidator, are
payable out of the company's assets in priority to all other claims.”
This is a consolidation of a provision originally introduced as s.144 of the Companies Act 1862.
Before the Court of Appeal's decision in Barleycorn, it was understood to elevate liquidation expenses
ahead of other unsecured claims, but not floating charges.5 It had been established early in the
history of corporate insolvency law that assets subject to a charge--floating or otherwise--did not form
part of the “assets of *L.Q.R. 297 the company” available for the unsecured creditors in liquidation,6
and hence that the 1862 Act did not affect the position of a debenture-holder.7 The “assets of the
company” were therefore the so-called “free assets”, meaning the company's unencumbered assets.
In Barleycorn, the Court of Appeal held that this position had been modified by the enactment of the
provisions now consolidated as s.175 of the Insolvency Act 1986, which provides as follows:
“(1) In a winding up the company's preferential debts … shall be paid in priority to all other debts.
(2) Preferential debts--
(a) rank equally among themselves after the expenses of the winding up and shall be paid in full,
unless the assets are insufficient to meet them, in which case they abate in equal proportions, and
(b) so far as the assets of the company available for payment of general creditors are insufficient to
meet them, have priority over the holders of debentures secured by, or holders of, any floating charge
created by the company, and shall be paid accordingly out of any property comprised in or subject to
that charge.”
Subsections 175(1) and (2)(a) derive from s.4 of the Companies Act 1883, which elevated preferential
debts (subject to liquidation expenses) ahead of other unsecured creditors. Subsection 175(2)(b)
derives from the Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Act 1897, which entitled preferential creditors to
be paid from floating charge assets where there were insufficient free assets.
Re Barleycorn Enterprises Ltd
Barleycorn concerned a claim for unpaid fees by a firm of accountants who had been commissioned
to produce a statement of affairs in respect of a company in liquidation. The statement of affairs
contained useful information that would have assisted the liquidator in performing his functions, and
the official receiver in any investigation into the company's demise. However, it transpired that the
company had no free assets. Unless recourse could be had to charged assets, the accountants would
receive no payment. Were this to happen, it would be difficult for liquidators to obtain statements of
affairs--and hence to perform their functions--in *L.Q.R. 298 subsequent similar cases.8 The Court of
Appeal, obviously influenced by a desire to do justice on the facts, allowed the accountants' appeal.
Lord Denning M.R., who gave the leading judgment, focused on the reference in what is now
s.175(2)(b) to the “assets of the company available for payment of the general creditors” in
contradistinction to the property comprised in or subject to a floating charge. The phrase was
narrower than “assets of the company”. Accordingly, he concluded that whilst before 1897, the term
“assets of the company” in what is now s.115 had referred to assets other than charged assets, the
effect of the 1897 Act was to expand it to include assets subject to a floating charge.9 Section 115
should therefore be interpreted as including assets subject to a floating charge, and hence liquidation
expenses took priority over the claims of the debenture-holder.
Lord Denning's textual analysis was buttressed by Phillimore L.J.,10 who envisaged absurd
consequences if the section were not interpreted in this way. If the meaning of “assets of the
company” had not changed, then the priority of liquidation expenses vis-à-vis preferential creditors
would depend upon the extent (if any) of the floating charge. He explained11 :
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“[The liquidator's] submission at the conclusion of his argument was that if there were free assets, that
is to say, assets not covered by some floating charge or debenture, then the proper order for payment
would be: first, the costs of the winding-up; secondly, the preferential debts; and, thirdly, the floating
charge. On the other hand if there were no free assets and everything was covered by the floating
charge, then the order would be: first, the preferential debts; secondly, the floating charge; and,
thirdly, the costs of the winding-up--which in practice would mean that whoever did the winding-up
would not get anything unless he had made some prior bargain. I find it very difficult to defend the
logic which would make the order of priority as between costs and preferential debts dependent upon
whether or not there was a floating charge.”
Buchler v Talbot
The decision in Barleycorn was overruled by the House of Lords in Buchler v Talbot. The issue was
whether liquidation expenses were payable out of funds in the hands of an administrative receiver,
where receivership *L.Q.R. 299 had preceded the liquidation but had not yet been completed.12 The
lower courts applied Barleycorn to answer the question in the affirmative.13 Their Lordships disagreed.
The first premise of their Lordships' analysis was the same as Lord Denning's, namely that prior to the
1897 Act, holders of floating charges had stood entirely outside the liquidation, because the assets
subject to their security did not form part of the “assets of the company”.14 The second premise was
that liquidation is conducted for the benefit of unsecured creditors--as Lord Hoffmann put it, the
procedure is a “collective execution” for general creditors.15 From these starting points, the House of
Lords reasoned that the 1897 Act did simply what it said: it entitled preferential creditors to look for
payment to floating charge assets where there were insufficient free assets to meet their claims. The
Act made no mention of liquidation expenses. Thus it had no effect on the priority of liquidation
expenses vis-à-vis the floating charge, and their Lordships could see no reason why it had impliedly
changed the law as to the meaning of the “assets of the company” so as to make the
debenture-holder bear the expenses of a procedure from which he did not benefit.16
In Lord Millett's view, Lord Denning had wrongly contrasted the term “assets of the company available
for the payment of general creditors” with “assets of the company”, when the proper counterpart was,
in fact, “any property comprised in [a floating] charge”.17 Indeed, if Lord Denning were right, and
“assets” were to be contrasted with “assets available for the general creditors” then, as Lord Millett
observed, there was no logical reason to restrict its expanded meaning simply to assets comprised in
a floating charge--fixed charge assets would be “assets” in this expanded sense too.18
The resulting position
After Buchler, the order of priority of payment from the “assets of the company” in liquidation is
therefore: (i) liquidation expenses; (ii) preferential creditors19 ; and (iii) unsecured creditors. Where the
assets are insufficient to pay the preferential creditors, then recourse may be had *L.Q.R. 300 to
floating charge assets. It is legitimate to use free assets first to pay liquidation expenses, and then to
throw the liability for the preferential debts onto the debenture-holder,20 but it is impermissible, where
the free assets do not even cover liquidation expenses, to recoup these expenses from floating
charge assets. When the debenture-holder enforces his security against a company in liquidation by
appointing a receiver, the order of payment from the realised assets will be (i) the expenses of the
receivership; (ii) preferential creditors (insofar as the liquidator cannot pay them out of free assets);
(iii) the debt secured; and (iv) the company.21
Their Lordships nevertheless conceded that in some situations, expenses incurred by the liquidator
should be payable from floating charge assets. First, where a liquidator incurs costs in preserving and
realising assets subject to a charge--perhaps because no receiver has been appointed--then the
chargee takes the benefit of the realisation, and so it is appropriate for him to bear the costs.22
Secondly, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead suggested that the liquidator's costs in discharging his
statutory obligation to pay preferential creditors might also be payable out of charged assets.23
Ironically, it is arguable that were the facts of Barleycorn to be litigated again today, these exceptions
would apply in the accountants' favour. The statement of affairs that they had prepared enabled the
subsequently appointed liquidator to ascertain the extent of the assets and liabilities, including the
preferential debts, and to determine that there were no free assets. No receiver having been
appointed, all that the liquidator was administering were assets subject to the debenture. It is at least
arguable that the accountants' costs were incurred in the ascertainment of the debenture-holder's
Page3
assets, or alternatively in the performance of the liquidator's statutory duty to pay the preferential
creditors.24 It appears that Barleycorn not only made bad law, but did so unnecessarily.
*L.Q.R. 301 III. ASSETS OF THE COMPANY: TWO FUNDS OR ONE?
The first premise in Buchler
The two premises of their Lordships' reasoning in Buchler are worthy of more detailed consideration.
The first--accepted also in Barleycorn --was that, save for any changes effected by the 1897 Act,
property subject to a floating charge did not constitute “assets of the company” available for
unsecured creditors in liquidation. This led Lord Hoffmann to dismiss Phillimore L.J.'s reasoning in
Barleycorn as “a complete muddle”.25 Since the “assets of the company” did not include floating
charge assets, it was incorrect to assert that claims for liquidation expenses, preferential debts and
secured debts were all against the same “fund”. Rather, the “assets of the company” and “assets
subject to security” should be thought of as two distinct “funds”, each of which bore its own expenses.
This analysis seems entirely orthodox.26 It is consistent with the position that the enforcement of a
charge does not constitute a disposition of the company's property under s.127 of the Insolvency Act
1986.27 Moreover, other provisions in the insolvency legislation that refer to the “assets of the
company” or the “property of the company” appear to relate solely to the free assets.28
Mortgages v charges
Nevertheless, it has been claimed by Rizwaan Mokal that the “two funds” theory is inconsistent with
basic property law principles.29 Mokal's argument is, in the first instance, based on the distinction
between charges and mortgages. It is axiomatic that the grant of a mere charge does not involve any
transfer of ownership,30 but creates a security interest “without any transfer of title or possession”.31
How, it is asked, can a charge be said to give rise to a second fund “belonging” to the chargee?
Surely, given that no title--legal or equitable--is transferred by the creation of a charge, the charged
assets remain part of the chargor's estate?
*L.Q.R. 302 This objection assumes that the use of the term “charge” necessarily connotes the
distinguishing characteristic of a mere charge, namely the specific appropriation of the charged
assets to the payment of the underlying debt, without the transfer of any sort of “ownership”.32 This is
not the case. In fact, the term “charge” is frequently used in a different sense--referring to an equitable
mortgage--as was explained by Buckley L.J. in Swiss Bank Corp v Lloyds Bank Ltd 33 :
“An equitable charge may, it is said, take the form either of an equitable mortgage or of an equitable
charge not by way of mortgage. An equitable mortgage is created when the legal owner of the
property constituting the security enters into some instrument or does some act which, though
insufficient to confer a legal estate or title in the subject matter on the mortgagee, nevertheless
demonstrates a binding intention to create a security in favour of the mortgagee, or in other words
evidences a contract to do so…. An equitable charge which is not an equitable mortgage is said to be
created when property is expressly or constructively made liable, or specially appropriated, to the
discharge of a debt or some other obligation, and confers on the chargee a right of realisation by
judicial process, that is to say, by the appointment of a receiver or an order for sale.”
This confluence of terminology probably originated in the sense in which the term “charge” was
historically used in the Court of Chancery. It literally meant a “direction” enforceable in Equity against
persons thereby bound.34 Such directions could take more than one form, including a “mere” charge,
being a direction to pay a debt from the proceeds of sale of a particular asset, and an “equitable
mortgage by way of charge”, being a direction to create a mortgage.
In contrast to the distinction between fixed and floating security, there has been no statutory
imperative to distinguish between charges stricto sensu and mortgages of personal property. Rather,
the relevant legislation has tended to bundle them together.35 As a result, both those drafting
debentures, and judges interpreting them, have often used the terms interchangeably.36
*L.Q.R. 303 If it were ever felt necessary to characterise a charge granted under a standard form
debenture, whereby the “chargee” is routinely granted all the remedies available to a mortgagee,37 the
result would surely be that in substance it creates an equitable mortgage rather than a mere charge.38
Indeed, it is common to find judicial reference to a “floating mortgage”.39 Of course, a floating security
differs from a fixed charge by way of equitable mortgage in that until crystallisation, the chargee only
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obtains an inchoate proprietary interest in the charged assets.40
Thus, in the vast majority of cases, the answer to Mokal's objection is simply that most debentures
are drafted so as to create charges by way of equitable mortgage, both fixed and floating. For floating
charges drafted in this fashion, it is the moment of crystallisation--rather than grant--at which the
assignment becomes effective, as indeed was noted by Lord Hoffmann in Buchler. 41
Ownership v property
It is nevertheless the case that a debenture may be drafted so as to create a floating security that is a
mere charge.42 The House of Lords gave no indication that their reasoning was not intended to extend
to such cases. In relation to such cases, Mokal asserts that their Lordships have confused beneficial
ownership of an asset with a proprietary right to payment from that asset.43 During the lifetime of a
mere charge, all the chargee has is the latter.44 Hence, if the chargee is not the beneficial owner, then
how can he be entitled to a “separate fund”, rather than simply having a right to prior payment from a
single fund to which the beneficial owner is also entitled?
*L.Q.R. 304 To answer this objection, it is necessary first to be clear that the word “fund” is not a
term of legal art carrying with it certain necessary or innate attributes, but simply a description of a
particular state of affairs. As Richard Nolan has carefully explained, to speak of “property in a fund” is
no more than an ellipsis,45 referring to a situation where the bundle of entitlements that together
comprise “ownership” of a particular underlying asset are partitioned between more than one party.46
Such a partition implies that one party--let us call him A--has proprietary rights in relation to certain
assets,47 which are not in his possession. The underlying assets are in the possession of another
party--let us call her B--who also enjoys proprietary rights in relation to them. Both A and B's rights
are limited by reference to each other's, and the sum of the entitlements they enjoy, between them, in
relation to the asset would (if united in a single person) comprise the incidents of “ownership”.48
The term “fund” is not, however, an appropriate term to describe every partition of proprietary rights in
relation to an asset. The ordinary meaning of the word is “a stock or sum of money, esp. one set apart
for a particular purpose”.49 It follows that it is ordinarily used as an ellipsis in relation to partitions that
are understood in terms of a sum of money--typically, the sum A expects to receive on sale of the
underlying assets--as opposed to the enjoyment to be had from the assets' use.50 A corollary of A's
lack of interest in the assets for their own sake is that B will typically be permitted, to a greater or
lesser degree, to substitute the underlying assets.51 Thus the term could encompass partitions where
the value of A's entitlements are measured either by reference to a fixed sum (as with a security
interest) or by reference to the residual value of the underlying assets (as with a beneficial interest).52
To say that a person is “entitled” to a fund is merely to say that he is entitled to the bundle of
entitlements he enjoys in relation to the underlying assets. There is no inconsistency in saying that a
fund to which an asset is subject “belongs” to A, even if A is not the beneficial owner of the underlying
asset, or indeed even if the same underlying asset is subject to *L.Q.R. 305 more than one fund.
Seen in this light, it is apparent that the term “fund” in the speeches in Buchler is merely a way of
summarising the parties' entitlements and obligations. The real question, therefore, concerns the
scope or terms of the liquidator's fund. Why is it that charged assets fall outside it? The liquidator's
fund being a creature of insolvency law, the answer to this question is not to be found in the general
law of property, but in insolvency law.
Insolvency law and the “assets of the company”
Mokal's objection based on property law is misconceived because it starts from the wrong point in
time. It asks how, when a (mere) charge is granted, a separate fund comes into existence which
“belongs” to the chargee. This, however, was not at issue in Buchler. Rather, the starting point of the
analysis in Buchler (and incidentally, in Barleycorn ) was that in liquidation, assets subject to a charge
are not part of the “assets of the company”, at least as regards the amount of the secured obligation,
and therefore not part of the “fund” available for distribution by the liquidator.
Mokal insists that assets subject to a charge remain subject to the company's beneficial ownership
until the security has been enforced, and therefore do not cease to be “assets of the company” in
liquidation.53 Yet, if the company's “assets” include assets subject to (mere) charges, then, to echo
Lord Millett,54 how is it that liquidators are not bound to distribute property subject to fixed charges to
the company's unsecured creditors?55 It appears that the objection proves too much.56
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Whilst it is true that their Lordships did not explain this point--presumably because they considered it
to be so fundamental as not to require elaboration--it follows inexorably from their (orthodox) account
of the function of liquidation. Like all statutory language, the meaning of the “assets of the company”
in liquidation must be understood in the context in which it is used. As the House of Lords recognised,
57 liquidation is a collective enforcement mechanism for the benefit of unsecured creditors. *L.Q.R.
306 Once a compulsory liquidation has commenced, unsecured creditors can no longer execute
individually and instead may only do so by participating in the collective proceedings.58 Secured
creditors stand “outside” this process,59 not being entitled to participate in the collective proceedings,60
but instead being permitted to enforce their security.61 It follows from the foregoing that if a winding-up
petition is disputed, it is the interests of the unsecured creditors that are paramount, it being
understood that secured creditors retain their rights of individual recourse.62 Moreover, the liquidator
is selected by a vote of the unsecured creditors,63 and his fiduciary duties to act in the “interests of the
liquidation” promote the maximisation of realisations for that group.64
Liquidation is also the occasion for the termination of the company's affairs. So as to ensure that,
consistently with the pari passu principle, creditors' claims are treated alike, it is necessary to identify
a single point in time at which assets and liabilities can be quantified for the purposes of the final
account.65 For liabilities, the relevant date is when the company goes into liquidation.66 Whilst the
account will actually be drawn up at some later point in time, the entire process is deemed to take
place instantaneously.67 This raises questions about how events occurring after the accounting date,
which are relevant to the status or quantification of creditors' claims, should be treated in the
accounting process. The answer lies in what Lord Hoffmann has felicitously termed the “hindsight
principle” 68 : namely, that subsequent events relevant to the quantification of liabilities or status of
claims must be reflected in the accounts,69 and the liability or claim in question should be valued as if
the subsequent event had already occurred by the accounting date.70
*L.Q.R. 307 The treatment of assets mirrors that of liabilities. When a company goes into liquidation,
it is stripped of the beneficial ownership of its assets, which from that moment forward are subject to
the “statutory trust”.71 Any purported alienation of the company's assets after the commencement of
liquidation is void,72 as is any prior contract purporting to grant an interest in the company's assets
after the company has gone into liquidation.73 The “assets” of the company falling into the statutory
trust comprise all legally protected entitlements which the liquidator is capable of alienating for value
for the benefit of the unsecured creditors.74 Yet, where an asset to which the company is entitled in
some way is subject to a proprietary claim that binds the liquidator and which is subsequently
enforced, then by symmetry with the treatment of contingent liabilities, the hindsight principle implies
that the “asset of the company” is treated as never having been more than the company's net
entitlement, after the proprietary claimant has taken that to which he is entitled.75
This principle is well illustrated in the case of Re Carl Hirth, 76 which concerned a claim by a
fraudster's trustee in bankruptcy against the liquidator of a shell company to which the fraudster had
transferred his assets so as to defeat his creditors. The transfer was held to amount to an act of
bankruptcy, and the trustee's title under the relevant Bankruptcy Act related back to that point. The
trustee's prior claim meant that, although the assets appeared to belong to the company, they did not
do so in fact and were therefore incapable of falling within the statutory trust. As Rigby L.J. explained
77 :
“What is meant by ‘the property of the company’? The property which apparently is vested in the
company at the time of the commencement of the winding-up, or the property which ultimately turns
out to be the property of the company? I venture to think that the latter must be the proper
construction. When the time for division has arrived you must find out if you can, and in the best way
you can, what is the property of the company, and divide that, and that only.”
*L.Q.R. 308 Similar reasoning applies to the case of property subject to a security interest. Whilst
secured creditors are formally stayed from enforcing their claims in liquidation by s.130(2) of the
Insolvency Act 1986, they are given leave to proceed as of right.78 This is because the liquidator, who
stands in no better position than the company, has no right to resist a secured creditor's action where
the company itself does not.79 When a chargee enforces, the proceeds of sale of the charged assets
become their property, up to the value of the assets or the debt secured, whichever is the smaller. By
a symmetric application of the hindsight principle, these assets are treated pro tanto as never having
fallen into the statutory trust. This point is made clear in a passage from Cotton L.J.'s judgment in Re
Pyle Works Ltd 80 :
“But then the question arises, what are to be considered ‘assets' or ‘property’ of the company? … [I]f
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the legal estate, so to speak, is outstanding in a mortgagee, then the only portion of that property
which the liquidator can look upon as a fund in the winding-up for payment of the debts of the
creditors will be the equity of redemption, or, in other words, that portion of the property remaining
after the satisfaction of all the obligations which the directors have properly thrown upon this part of
the property of the company. Therefore, in my opinion, although the assets of the company must …
be applied by the liquidator in payment pari passu of all the creditors then unpaid, yet property which
is in mortgage is not, in my opinion, ‘assets' of the company in the sense in which that is to be done,
namely, free assets, assets which can be dealt with by the company in payment of their debts without
regard to those who have a mortgage on this portion of the property of the company ” (emphasis
added).
This is a particularly helpful illustration, for the italicised portion of his Lordship's reasoning makes
clear that the starting point for the analysis is not that the secured creditor is, at any point prior to
enforcement, the “owner” of the property, but rather that because he enforces, its value is deemed
pro tanto to be outwith the “assets of the company”. Although Cotton L.J. refers to “mortgages”, the
conceptual machinery he employs is equally applicable to assets subject to a charge, or more
generally to any contract specifically enforceable against the liquidator. The reasoning illuminates why
the enforcement of such contracts does not amount to *L.Q.R. 309 a “disposition of the company's
property” under s.127 of the Insolvency Act 1986.81
Indeed, the statutory scheme goes further than merely waiting for enforcement to take place before
deeming assets subject to security to be pro tanto outside the liquidator's fund. The treatment of proof
by secured creditors shows that they are presumed to enforce their security unless they indicate
otherwise. A secured creditor may not prove in liquidation unless he elects to surrender his security
for the benefit of the creditors.82 This demonstrates that the legislation proceeds on the
common-sense assumption that any creditor with valid security will, on the liquidation of his debtor,
proceed to enforce it.83
To recapitulate: insofar as they are subject to valid security, assets simply do not form part of the
liquidator's fund. Of course, legal title to the entirety of the charged assets will remain with the
company until the moment they are sold or foreclosed upon. Yet it follows from the foregoing analysis
that, insofar as they are subject to the secured creditor's rights, they form a separate fund from that
which the liquidator is required to administer.
Returning briefly to Buchler, we can see that the “liquidator's fund” is merely shorthand for the
ultimate pecuniary value of the “company assets” falling into the statutory trust, which as we have
seen, does not include charged assets. The “debenture-holder's fund”, on the other hand, comprises
only the proprietary entitlement to the value of the security as regards the assets secured.84 To object
that the debenture-holder is not “owner” of the underlying assets, absent foreclosure, is simply beside
the point that his entitlements lie outside the reach of the statutory trust. It follows that in the
numerous instances in which members of the judiciary have referred to assets subject to security as
the “property” of the debenture-holder,85 the term is used in the sense of holding proprietary rights, as
opposed to ownership.
*L.Q.R. 310 Re M.C. Bacon Ltd
Before leaving this section, it is necessary to consider a related objection based upon certain other
principles of insolvency law. This is that Buchler appears to be inconsistent with views expressed by
Millett J. (as he then was) concerning the grant of a charge in Re M.C. Bacon Ltd. 86 In that case, the
liquidator challenged a standard debenture package (including fixed and floating charges) on the
basis that its grant had constituted a transaction at undervalue.87 For s.238 of the Insolvency Act to
apply, a company must have entered into a transaction gratuitously, or in return for a consideration
significantly less than that which it gave. Millett J. held that the grant of a security over the company's
property did not amount to the company giving any “consideration” at all. His Lordship explained88 :
“The mere creation of a security over a company's assets does not deplete them and does not come
within [s.238]. By charging its assets the company appropriates them to meet the liabilities due to the
second creditor and adversely affects the rights of other creditors in the event of insolvency. But it
does not deplete its assets or diminish their value.”
Mokal asserts an inconsistency between this statement and the reasoning in Buchler : how can M.C.
Bacon be right and yet a charge create a separate fund?89 Again, however, this confuses different
questions. First, s.238 is by definition concerned with transactions that take place before the company
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goes into liquidation.90 Hence Millett J. speaks of the creation of a charge, not of its treatment in
liquidation. Secondly, the section makes no reference to the “assets of the company”, but simply to
the value of consideration. Thus when Millett J. speaks of “assets”, he uses the phrase in a different
sense to that employed in the provisions of the Act dealing with the mechanics of liquidation. He
refers to the company's net assets in a going-concern accounting sense, not the assets available for
the unsecured creditors in liquidation as defined by statute. A transaction for which the company
receives significantly less consideration than it gives will necessarily deplete the net assets. However,
the grant of a charge does not, because it simply gives the chargee an alternative right of recourse.91
The chargee may not pursue the company for any greater sum than he was otherwise entitled, and so
the net assets are unaffected.92
*L.Q.R. 311 IV. THE FUNCTION OF LIQUIDATION
The second premise in Buchler
The second premise of the reasoning in Buchler is that liquidation is “a form of collective execution by
all its creditors against all its available assets.” 93 As liquidation is run purely for the benefit of
unsecured creditors (and possibly, contributories) and a debenture-holder has no interest in the
proceeding,94 it follows that it is unfair to subject the debenture-holder's fund to the expenses of
liquidation.
Whilst this is a good account of liquidation's basic function, does it fail to give sufficient weight to the
public aspects of insolvency law? In particular, a subsidiary function of liquidation is to act as a
vehicle for the ex post enforcement of “commercial morality”.95 It may be objected that floating
charge-holders derive benefits from the proper performance of these public functions, and it is
therefore justifiable to require them to pay for this through the funding of liquidations.96 However this
objection, like that from property law, is also misconceived.97 In order to see why, it is necessary to
consider--in general terms--the relationship between the public and private elements of insolvency
law.
Historically, insolvency proceedings have been concerned with the enforcement of morality through
the retrospective investigation of the debtor's affairs and the visitation of appropriate sanctions. In
relation to corporate debtors, this pattern has complemented English law's rather more diffident
approach to the enforcement of directors' duties whilst companies are still trading. There are sound
commercial reasons why litigation against delinquent directors of trading companies may be
undesirable--cost, loss of management time and negative publicity, to name but a few.98 These
concerns are reflected in the restrictive standing requirements for derivative actions,99 and the
still-evolving requirement that to be remediable under s.459 of the Companies Act 1985, a breach of
directors' duties harming the petitioner's interests must be *L.Q.R. 312 sufficiently serious as to
constitute “unfair” prejudice.100 For participants in solvent companies, there are, of course, a number
of other practical ways of dealing with directors that are cheaper and more effective than litigation.
The law's “hands off” approach to the working boardroom developed in the shadow of its traditionally
“hands on” approach to the ex post investigation and sanctioning of directorial conduct in the context
of corporate failure. The public elements of insolvency law are the major planks of this ex post
approach. In liquidation, there are three such elements101 : prosecution, disqualification and civil
remedies against directors and others.102 In the rest of this section, we consider prosecution and
disqualification in turn, paying particular attention respectively to how the processes are funded and
which parties may be expected to benefit from their effects. The funding of civil remedies raises rather
more complex issues that we postpone until the next section.
Prosecution
The Insolvency Act, subs.218(3) and (4) require a liquidator, to whom it appears that any officer of the
company may have been guilty of an offence in relation to the company,103 to report the matter to the
official receiver or Secretary of State, who will then consider whether prosecution is warranted.
Moreover, in compulsory liquidation, the official receiver is, in all cases, obliged to investigate the
company's affairs and, in particular, the reasons for the company's failure.104 Thus, the liquidator's
functions involve a certain amount of investigative work. The costs of any actual prosecution will, of
course, be at public expense,105 but the costs of preparing any liquidator's or official receiver's report,
and of precursory public or private examinations of the company's officers,106 are chargeable to the
liquidation expenses.107 Increasing the likelihood of prosecution in *L.Q.R. 313 this fashion may be
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expected to have a deterrent effect on the proscribed conduct. Thus the benefit of the office-holder's
investigations might be expected to be reaped by all those dealing with companies.
Disqualification
Investigation and reporting by the office-holder of directors' conduct is also the mechanism by which
liquidation facilitates the disqualification of delinquent directors. Under s.7(3) of the Company
Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (“CDDA”), every office-holder to whom it appears that there may
be grounds for concluding that a director or former director is “unfit to be concerned in the
management of a company” must submit a report to the Secretary of State.108 If the Secretary of State
decides to proceed, then the court is obliged under CDDA, s.6 to disqualify the director in question
where it is satisfied as to his “unfitness”.109 Thus office-holders' reports provide the foundation upon
which disqualification cases are built.
Whilst the costs of the disqualification process are largely borne by the Secretary of State, the
office-holder's costs in investigating and preparing the report are expenses of the relevant insolvency
proceeding.110 As with prosecution, disqualification is said to benefit the public at large by keeping
unfit directors “off the road” and by encouraging other directors, through general deterrence, to
maintain standards in their conduct of the company's affairs.111
Funding the public functions of liquidation: a provisional assessment
The picture so far is that the initial investigations leading to prosecution or disqualification are carried
out by liquidators at the expense of the company's creditors, even though the benefits of these
processes ultimately go to the general public. Yet the existence of such public functions, which must
be funded from liquidation expenses, does not undermine the second premise of Buchler --that
liquidation is essentially a procedure for the benefit of unsecured creditors.
Of the two mechanisms considered so far, disqualification is by far the most significant in practice. In
2002, nearly 2,000 directors were *L.Q.R. 314 disqualified,112 about ten times the number of
convictions secured following winding-up.113 Moreover, the contribution of insolvency proceedings to
disqualification is not unique to liquidation. All office-holders must make reports under CDDA, s.7(3).
The investigatory and preparatory costs of such reports must be borne as “expenses” of the relevant
procedure in administrative receivership, administration and liquidation alike. Of course, only
liquidation is a vehicle for investigations leading to prosecution. However, conduct which would render
a director liable to prosecution would also render him liable to disqualification, so the same
investigatory work may be expected to suffice for both. Thus, there will be minimal extra cost which
must be borne by the estate in liquidation.114 The emergent picture is that all corporate insolvency
proceedings--not just liquidation--involve public aspects which must be paid for in part from the
expenses of the proceeding.115 In light of this, it is perfectly apt to describe liquidation as “essentially”
a process of collective execution. It undeniably involves some public aspects, but these are
subsidiary, and more importantly for present purposes, are not what distinguishes it from other
insolvency proceedings.
Distinguishing other insolvency procedures
Other insolvency procedures may, however, be distinguished from liquidation by reference to the
parties for whose benefit they operate. After Buchler, the burden of the expenses of each procedure
is now allocated consistently with this distinction. In liquidation, expenses are borne by the unsecured
creditors, for whose benefit the procedure is run, whereas in administrative receivership, which
functions for the exclusive benefit of the debenture-holder, the expenses are borne solely out of the
debentureholder's fund.116 Administrative receivership has of course been prospectively abolished by
the insolvency provisions of the Enterprise Act 2002, *L.Q.R. 315 and in its place chargees are now
encouraged to use a streamlined administration regime.117 The new procedure is run for the benefit of
all creditors, and it is therefore appropriate that the costs should be shared between secured and
unsecured creditors--an approximation to which is achieved by making the expenses of administration
payable ahead of the floating charge.118
V. FUNDING INSOLVENCY LITIGATION
The context
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The civil actions potentially available to a liquidator are, in outline:
(i) A summary procedure for misfeasance by officers of the company, intended to provide an
expedited mechanism whereby wrongdoing by the company's directors may be remedied in
liquidation.119
(ii) Actions for fraudulent or wrongful trading, intended to encourage directors not to take actions
during the “twilight” period that will harm creditors' interests.120
(iii) Actions for transaction avoidance, intended to discourage misbehaviour during the transition from
factual to formal insolvency.121
It is well known that these actions, which form the third “public aspect” of liquidation, have been
rendered ineffective by difficulties with the funding of litigation.122 What has been less well understood,
however, is the extent to which these difficulties in funding are in large part “ripple effects” traceable
to the Court of Appeal's decision in Barleycorn. This means that the House of Lords' excision of
Barleycorn from the jurisprudence has potentially significant implications for the funding of insolvency
litigation. It paves the way to the amelioration of the existing difficulties, increasing the likelihood of
privately-financed enforcement in the future, with consequent public benefits by way of deterrence.
*L.Q.R. 316 A framework for analysis
Three particular questions have taxed courts and commentators in relation to the funding of these
actions. The way in which these questions are answered affects the likelihood that an office-holder
will be able to enforce any relevant claims. The questions, and their implications, are as follows:
(i) Destination: Do recoveries from successful actions fall within the scope of a floating charge? No
liquidator would wish to bring an action simply to see the proceeds go to a debentureholder. Yet if the
proceeds do fall within the scope of the charge, then the debenture-holder may be willing to fund the
litigation themselves.
(ii) Expenses: Even where recoveries go to the unsecured creditors, can a liquidator recoup the costs
of an action as “expenses of the liquidation”? Clearly, if he cannot, he has no incentive to bring
proceedings.
(iii) Assignability: Can liquidators assign rights in such actions to third parties, on terms that the
assignee funds the action in return for a share of any recoveries, without contravening the law's
general prohibition on champerty?123 If such assignment is possible, then it may be possible for
actions to be financed externally even if the liquidator is unable to charge the costs as “expenses of
the liquidation”.
We now chart, chronologically, how the answers to these questions had evolved prior to the decision
in Buchler, and in particular, how they were influenced by the decision in Barleycorn.
Before Buchler v Talbot
Destination: Re Yagerphone Ltd
The destination question was first considered in relation to misfeasance recoveries. In Re
Anglo-Austrian Printing and Publishing Union, 124 Vaughan Williams J. held that they fell into the
floating charge, being the fruits of a right that had come into existence when the relevant wrongs had
been done to the company prior to liquidation.
A distinction was subsequently drawn between actions for misfeasance, which may be brought in the
company's name to enforce pre-existing causes of action, and what may be termed “office-holder
actions”, namely those causes of action that are not created until the commencement of *L.Q.R. 317
insolvency proceedings, and must be brought in the office-holder's name (such as actions for
transaction avoidance, and now for wrongful trading). In Re Yagerphone Ltd, 125 Bennett J. held that a
liquidator's recoveries from a successful preference action could not be claimed by a
debenture-holder, because the right to recover the money from the preferred creditor vested in the
liquidator exclusively for the benefit of unsecured creditors. Thus the recoveries were126 :
“[A] sum of money received by the liquidators impressed in their hands with a trust for those creditors
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amongst whom they had to distribute the assets of the company.”
This ground was approved in subsequent cases as being the ratio of the decision.127
Expenses: Re M.C. Bacon Ltd (No.2)
One such case was Re M.C. Bacon Ltd (No.2), 128 a decision at the heart of the problems in this area.
A liquidator had unsuccessfully challenged the validity of a bank's debenture under ss.238 and 239 of
the Insolvency Act.129 The liquidator was ordered to pay the bank's costs. He applied for an order
permitting him to recoup the bank's and his own costs from assets subject to the bank's now
vindicated floating charge. His argument, which seemed “unassailable” in light of Barleycorn, 130 was
that the costs were liquidation expenses and therefore payable out of floating charge assets in priority
to the preferential debts and the bank's claim under s.175.
The outcome for which the liquidator contended was patently unjust. It required the vindicated charge
to be subordinated to the costs of the failed challenge, thereby violating the “loser pays” principle of
civil litigation.131 The just result was equally obvious: ss.238 and 239 being office-holder actions, any
recoveries would have benefited the unsecured creditors alone, and hence the costs should only ever
have been chargeable to the free assets.132 However, Millett J.'s ability to reach this result was
constrained by the decision in Barleycorn. His precarious route *L.Q.R. 318 of escape was to hold
that the costs fell outside the “expenses of the liquidation”--that is, that they were not “expenses
properly chargeable or incurred…by the liquidator in preserving, realising or getting in any of the
assets of the company” within r.4.218(1)(a) of the Insolvency Rules, as then worded. His reasoning
was as follows. First, he applied Yagerphone to hold that recoveries following a liquidator's application
under s.239 enured for the benefit of the “general body of creditors”, and as such never became part
of the company's assets, but were simply held by the liquidator subject to the statutory trust for the
unsecured creditors.133 Secondly, in a step dictated by expediency rather than rigour, he concluded
that, because the recoveries fell directly into the statutory trust, the costs had not been incurred in
“preserving, realising or getting in any of the assets of the company ”.134 Thus the liquidator's costs
were not payable as liquidation expenses, and Millett J. avoided the unjust result that would otherwise
have followed as an unintended consequence of Barleycorn. Unfortunately, M.C. Bacon itself had an
unintended consequence: by denying a liquidator recoupment of his costs from liquidation expenses,
it negated his incentive to bring office-holder actions. The ripples from Barleycorn continued to
spread.
Assignability: Re Oasis Merchandising Ltd
Worse still, the distinction drawn in M.C. Bacon between “assets of the company” and “office-holder
recoveries” was applied mechanically in a subsequent line of authorities to reach the conclusion that
the liquidator had no power to assign any interest in the proceeds of these causes of action. This
further exacerbated the funding difficulties. The high watermark was Re Oasis Merchandising
Services Ltd, 135 a case in which the liquidator, who had commenced wrongful trading proceedings,
entered into an agreement with an external funder on terms that the funder would meet the
liquidator's costs in return for a share of any recoveries. The agreement was prima facie
champertous,136 but the liquidator argued that it was validated by his statutory power “to sell any of
the company's property”.137 The Court of Appeal held that recoveries from a successful wrongful
trading action were not “company property” falling within the liquidator's power of sale and stayed the
action on the ground that it was tainted by the illegal funding agreement. Drawing on both
Yagerphone and M.C. Bacon (No.2), Peter Gibson L.J. distinguished between assets which *L.Q.R.
319 are the “property of the company” at the time of the commencement of liquidation--including any
rights of action that might have been pursued by the company prior to liquidation--and those assets
which only arise after the liquidation of the company, including recoveries obtained by the liquidator
pursuant to statutory powers conferred on him.138 In his view, only the former constituted “property of
the company” which an office-holder was entitled to sell.
Expenses again: the “Floor Fourteen amendment”
Although dicta of the Court of Appeal in Katz v McNally 139 appeared to cast doubt on
the reasoning in M.C. Bacon (No.2), a differently-constituted court took the
opportunity to reinforce the M.C. Bacon/Oasis orthodoxy in Re Floor Fourteen Ltd. 140
In response to disquiet over the outcome in the latter case, Parliament amended
r.4.218(1)(a), to provide that the expenses of liquidation should include141 :
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“Expenses or costs … relating to the conduct of any legal proceedings which he has power to bring or
defend whether in his own name or the name of the company.”
Unfortunately, the amended rule went much further than was necessary as it seemed to require a
court faced with the facts of M.C. Bacon (No.2) to reach the very outcome that Millett J. had struggled
so hard to avoid.142 Whereas M.C. Bacon (No.2) and Oasis stifled office-holder litigation, the
amendment appeared to have disinterred the original problem caused by the Barleycorn decision.
Implications of the pre-Buchler position
As this brief review has demonstrated, the ripples from the Court of Appeal's decision in Barleycorn
gave rise to a sequence of troublesome cases that impacted upon the funding of insolvency litigation.
To summarise the position prior to Buchler, the three basic questions in this area were answered as
follows:
(i) Destination: It was a hard and fast rule that the future recoveries of office-holder actions were
neither “assets” nor “property” of the company for the purposes of the various *L.Q.R. 320 statutory
provisions concerned with the expenses of winding up and the office-holder's power of sale.143
(ii) Expenses: The law had oscillated between absurdities: first (under M.C. Bacon ) the costs of
office-holder actions were not recoverable as liquidation expenses at all; later (following the
amendment to the Insolvency Rules), they could be recouped as of right as an expense of the
winding up, out of floating charge assets, seemingly even in respect of an unsuccessful challenge to
the validity of the debenture.
(iii) Assignability: Neither office-holder actions nor their fruits could be assigned under the power of
sale to external funders on sensible commercial terms.144
The impact of Buchler v Talbot
In a telling passage in his speech in Buchler, Lord Millett made the following observations145 :
“In Re M.C. Bacon Ltd [(No.2) ] a liquidator claimed that the costs of an unsuccessful attempt to set a
floating charge aside should be paid out of the assets subject to the charge in priority to the claims of
the charge-holder. But for the decision in Barleycorn the claim could not have got off the ground. A
more absurd and unjust outcome could hardly be imagined. The court was able to avoid it only by
finding a way to disallow the costs of the action as recoverable expenses of the liquidation.”
By overruling Barleycorn, the House of Lords cured the malady for which the reasoning in Bacon was
prescribed. There is no longer any need to continue to endure the side effects of the prescription.
Buchler therefore opens the way to a rationalisation of these authorities in a way that could facilitate
the development of a market for the funding of insolvency litigation. Let us now consider the impact of
the decision on each of these questions in turn.
*L.Q.R. 321 Destination
This question goes to the heart of the relationship between property law and insolvency law, and in
particular the function of liquidation. These are issues to which, as we have seen, Buchler speaks
clearly. The decision reaffirms (i) that insolvency proceedings should not, absent clear statutory
language to the contrary, be the occasion for the alteration of pre-existing proprietary rights146 ; and
(ii) that winding-up proceedings are for the benefit of unsecured creditors alone.147 These propositions
serve to reinforce the pre-existing position in relation to destinations: that the recoveries falling into
the debenture-holder's fund should be, and should only be, those recoveries which the
debenture-holder would be capable of realising by an action brought outside liquidation.
Considering first recoveries from misfeasance actions, the two propositions square exactly with the
reasoning of Vaughan Williams J. in Anglo-Austrian Printing and Publishing Union. 148 Such
recoveries are the fruits of causes of action that came into being during the company's life. These
causes of action could have been enforced on the debenture-holder's behalf by a receiver. The fact
that the company has gone into liquidation is not an occasion for the expropriation of the
debenture-holder, and so the recoveries are for his benefit, minus an allowance for the liquidator's
particular costs in obtaining them.
Turning to office-holder actions, the propositions also tend to support the conclusion of Bennett J. in
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Yagerphone. Office-holder actions vest in the liquidator and form part of the means at his disposal for
carrying out his functions in the interests of unsecured creditors. They represent assets which come
into existence on liquidation, and so cannot be recovered by the company when solvent. It follows
that neither a debenture-holder nor his receiver has standing to pursue an office-holder action, and so
the fruits of such actions cannot be reached by a debenture-holder enforcing his security outside
liquidation.149 Just as the advent of liquidation does not deplete a chargee's pre-liquidation proprietary
rights, it surely cannot be the occasion for their enhancement.150 It follows that a debentureholder
should not be allowed to claim office-holder recoveries arising from the exercise of the liquidator's
statutory powers.151 This analysis rests solely on Yagerphone and does not depend on the distinction
drawn in Bacon and Oasis between “company property” at the commencement of *L.Q.R. 322
liquidation and subsequently accruing office-holder recoveries.152 Rather, the point is that as
office-holder actions vest in the liquidator in his capacity as manager of the fund of free assets (which
enures to the benefit of unsecured creditors), the structure of the insolvency legislation necessarily
implies that such recoveries are not so chargeable.153
All this is not to say that an office-holder action can never bring benefits to a debenture-holder. There
may be circumstances where a debentureholder has continuing rights in property that has been
alienated by the company through a transaction subsequently vulnerable to challenge by an
office-holder action.154 In such cases, the “two funds” theory implies that a portion of the “recoveries”
of any such action, commensurate to the value of the chargee's rights, would be directed to the
debenture-holder's fund.155 This respects the chargee's pre-insolvency entitlements. As a corollary,
the debenture-holder should not benefit from the liquidator's “recovery” if its former proprietary rights
have been extinguished--for example, if the alienation of the assets occurred in the ordinary course of
business at a time when the charge was uncrystallised.156 To allow the debenture-holder to benefit in
such circumstances would make him better off in liquidation than under the general law.157
Expenses
If Buchler merely clarified and reinforced the pre-existing position in relation to the destination of
recoveries, it clearly changed matters in relation to the “expenses question”. Although, by virtue of the
2002 amendment to the Insolvency Rules, it is beyond doubt that the costs of office-holder actions
count as liquidation expenses, Buchler means that these expenses can now only be recouped from
the free assets. This has the welcome effect of ensuring that the debenture-holder can never be
forced to pay for the costs of an unsuccessful challenge to the debenture. At the *L.Q.R. 323 same
time, by reducing the likely size of the asset pool available to pay liquidation expenses, it appears to
undermine the liquidator's incentives to pursue office-holder actions.158 But as we shall see, to focus
on this is to lose sight of the bigger picture.
Assignability
It appears that Buchler may have had a positive impact on the assignability of office-holder
recoveries. In short, it is arguable that the House of Lords have impliedly overruled the Court of
Appeal's decision in Oasis.
The starting point for the argument is the conceptual problems of the analysis in Oasis. Recall that in
Barleycorn, the “assets of the company” had been viewed as a single fund, comprising a blend of free
assets and those subject to a floating charge. Against this background, the courts in M.C. Bacon
(No.2) and Oasis were driven to hold that the fruits of officeholder actions fell outside this single fund.
159 To sidestep Barleycorn in this way, the office-holder recoveries had to exist in the ether, being
neither charged assets available to the debenture-holder, nor “company property” to be administered
by the liquidator. This, however, was conceptually flawed, for if office-holder recoveries were not
“assets of the company” in liquidation, then how were they to be administered, given that the statute
directs the liquidator to distribute only “assets of the company”?160 If there ever was a “separate funds
fallacy”, this was surely it.161
The decision in Buchler resolves this confusion. It clarifies that the debenture-holder's and unsecured
creditors' assets form two separate funds. In this milieu, office-holder recoveries either form a third
fund (in the ether),162 or are properly understood as falling within the liquidator's fund--in which case
the House of Lords has impliedly overruled Oasis. The latter is the better view, for three reasons.
First, as we have seen, the Oasis analysis is conceptually flawed. Secondly, the benefit of
officeholder recoveries will ordinarily go to the unsecured creditors. Buchler makes clear that costs
are borne by the fund available to the party who benefits from the relevant expenditure. It would be a
curious result if, because they were not classed as part of the “assets of the company”, office-holder
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recoveries were not available to pay the general expenses of the liquidation--incurred for the
exclusive benefit of the unsecured creditors--notwithstanding that such recoveries are a fund
available for the unsecured creditors. Thirdly, and most importantly, by excising *L.Q.R. 324
Barleycorn from insolvency jurisprudence, Buchler removes the need for conceptual contortions. In
light of Buchler, the better view is that office-holder recoveries fall into the “assets of the company”.163
In turn, this implies that office-holder recoveries are “property of the company” within the power of
sale.
If, as we contend, the interpretation of “company property” in Oasis cannot stand with Buchler, it
would be open to a judge at first instance to disregard Oasis were an appropriate test case to be
brought.164 A market for external financing of office-holder actions, stopped in its tracks by the Oasis
decision, could be allowed to develop.165 This would provide access to a much wider range of funding
for office-holder actions than would be available even if the office-holder's costs could be recouped
from floating charge assets. At the same time, the possibility that a debenture-holder might have to
fund a challenge to his own security is eliminated. Thus, if the impact on assignability is fully
appreciated, the position after Buchler may represent a considerable liberalisation of the possibilities
for funding insolvency litigation. In turn, this could--counter-intuitively--allow the public functions of
liquidation to be performed much more effectively.
Summary
The effects of the decision in Buchler on the three “funding questions” may be summarised as follows:
(i) Destinations : By emphasising the function of liquidation as primarily benefiting unsecured
creditors, Buchler supports the conclusion in Yagerphone that recoveries from office-holder actions
that would benefit unsecured creditors, in contrast to actions brought under the misfeasance
procedure, are not chargeable by the company.166
(ii) Expenses : The costs of office-holder recoveries remain recoverable as “expenses of the
liquidation.” However, because floating charge assets are no longer available to pay these *L.Q.R.
325 expenses, the funds available to the liquidator from this source have been curtailed.
(iii) Assignability : By overruling Barleycorn, Buchler has removed the need for the illogical distinction
drawn between “company property” and office-holder recoveries in Bacon and Oasis. Insofar as they
rest upon this reasoning, these decisions can no longer be supported. The better view is that
officeholder recoveries are “property of the company” capable of assignment by the liquidator.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has explored the reasoning and implications of the House of Lords' decision in Buchler
with two goals in mind. First, it has sought to demonstrate that the decision is consistent both with
general property law concepts and with the structure of insolvency law. The decision has not
disturbed settled jural relations in relation to security interests. Rather, it concerns the unravelling of
such relations and their value in the insolvency context. Whether a charge-holder is an “owner” at
point of grant is not the issue. Moreover, the House of Lords' characterisation of liquidation as a
mechanism for collective execution by unsecured creditors is apt. Whilst there are some public
aspects to liquidation proceedings, these are in large part common to all insolvency proceedings, and
so do not distinguish liquidation from other insolvency procedures.
Secondly, the analysis suggests that the decision could form the basis for a beneficial approach to the
resolution of the difficulties that have plagued the funding of litigation by office-holders. Whilst
liquidators may bemoan the fact that the costs will not be recoverable from floating charge assets, this
will avoid any transgression of the “loser pays” principle where a debenture is unsuccessfully
challenged. Moreover, with the Court of Appeal's decision in Barleycorn consigned to history, the
difficulties in the case law concerning assignment of office-holder actions may be ironed out. Indeed,
the way may now be open for a market in these claims to be developed, enhancing the likelihood of
enforcement and the consequent public benefits that this will entail.
The government has recently made clear that it intends, through a clause included in the Company
Law Reform Bill, to reverse the decision in Buchler. 167 Such a move, which would weaken the
function-based demarcation between insolvency procedures and open the door once more to the use
of floating charge assets to challenge a debenture-holder's security, is not supported by this article's
analysis. Nevertheless, even *L.Q.R. 326 if the specific result of the decision is reversed by statute,
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this should not detract from the broader principles it enunciates regarding the function of liquidation,
and the implications of these for the funding of insolvency litigation.
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